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A 19TH CENTURY VIEW OF THE STUDY OF LAW.
A NINETEENTH CENTURY VIEW OF THE
STUDY OF LAW.*
The study of law demands not only a knowledge of
legal principles and of the reasons on which they rest, but
a mastery of the lawful modes of using and enforcing them.
The infinitely multiplied relations of man in society, out of
which spring the legal rules by which he is to be governed,
demand the wisest methods for using rightfully such potent
forces-methods to elicit the exact truth amid uncertainties
and disputes, by eliminating every element of falsehood
and doubt-which will, with clearness, directness, simplicity,
and certainty, conduct each investigation to positive results,
and photograph each step along the pathway trod. The
labors of more than two thousand years in this direction
have been recorded for our guidance. All that human intel-
lect could do in the past has been done and the benefit of that
accumulated wisdom is ours today. In our time some would-
be reformers, ignorant of the science whose machineries
they would change or destroy, and ignorant, too, of every
part of the machinery on whose nice adjustment success
depends, seem to have absurdly supposed that legislative
enactments can supply the lack of common sense and sound
learning-that a dash of a pen by a brainless licentiate can
become a sovereign panacea for legal ills, or that the diversi-
fied relationships of human society and pursuits can be
attuned to infinite harmonies by the unskilled touch of
ignorance and stupidity. Such vain pretenders belong to
no country and to no time. More than eighteen centuries
ago an inspired apostle rebuked them and their follies, and
in so doing announced one of the most vital of legal truths:
*From an Address delivered by the late Hon. Samuel Treat, U. S.
District Judge, at the Inauguration of the St. Louis Law School (now Wash-
ington University School of Law), on October 16, 1867.
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"From which some having swerved, have turned aside
into vain jangling, desiring to be teachers of the law, under-
standing neither what they say nor whereof they affirm. But
we know that the law is good, if a man use it lawfully."
An eternal verity !-that lawful ends must be sought
only through lawful means; that the lawless use of the right
is not and never can be a good; that the abuse of the potent
enginery of the law is the grossest violation of law-sub-
versive, sacrilegious! That divine utterance is an ever-living
command, prescribing the inexorable condition on which
public and private happiness must always rest. Whoever
would trample down the forms created by law for the purity
of its administration, or pervert those forms to the injury
of his neighbor, on the plea that the end sought was an
admissible good, would assail the lawful and the right within
their hallowed strongholds-behind the barriers erected as
their essential safeguards.
It is gross solecism that wrong modes of action can be
right, or subserve the right; that lawlessness in any form can
be lawful. In matters of largest moment we are too prone to
judge by the end sought, while in insianificant affairs we
promptly condemn improper appliances. No mechanic would.
hesitate to ridicule an attempt by impossible mechanism to
effect a specified mechanical result, construct the sought-for
machine, or produce the needed fabric. Still some innovators
insist upon the adjustment of the complicated machinery of
law by processes wholly unsuited to the purpose, and impos-
sible of success.
The ignorant physician tampers with life and health; the
ignorant attorney with life, liberty, and property. The former
should know the disease and its curative process; the lat-
ter the wrong to be redressed or prevented, and the appro-
priate remedies therefor.
It is the boast of modern philosophy that its wonderful
progress is due to the Baconian system or the true law of
method. No one fails now to recognize that a true mode of
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investigation is essential to discovery; that none but rightful
modes of proceeding are likely to ultimate in right results.
Philosophically, the method of doing is a primary considera-
tion. Instruments fit for the purpose, and the correct use of
them, are indispensable to the desired progress or achieve-
ment; and that fact is peculiar to no department of
labor or enterprise. It is just as obvious to the humblest
laborer as to the most successful philosopher-to the farmer,
as to the statesman-to the artisan, as to the general-to the
hodman, as to the jurist-to the servant, as to the served.
Why, then, should it not be fully recognized and en-
forced in the investigation of human rights, or the adminis-
tration of law? Should a system designed to secure order
and harmony be without order or method-falsify its own
nature in its modes of proceeding?
For centuries legal methods were comparatively well de-
fined and accurate. They eliminated admitted from disputed
points, and narrowed down litigation to the only questions
demanding judicial solution. They exacted searching modes
of investigation, logical statements, and the orderly conduct
of a cause from its inception to its close, so that each step
might be clearly seen, and follow the preceding in the right
direction; marching straightforward to the contemplated end.
There was very little doubt or uncertainty as to what was to
be done, or how it was to be done; and when done, as to what
had really been adjudicated.
It is a fixed maxim that the public good demands an end
to strife-interest reipublicae sit finis litium; but how can
strife end, if through irregular and uncertain modes of pro-
ceeding it becomes impossible to know what has been liti-
gated or decided? It would be absurd to urge that im-
methodical or chaotic modes of action can lead to precision
or certainty; yet ignorance and prejudice insist that the most
complicated and delicate of human interests can be properly
adjusted without order, method, or system.
An English statesman has asserted that it has cost Great
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Britain a sum equal to its existing national debt, to bring
practice and pleadings in its courts to their existing perfec-
tion. The remark is not extravagant-is far within the limits
of truth. In adopting that system-the fruits of its expendi-
ture and experience-our wisest jurists supposed we started
from vantage ground. True, we could not fail to see that too
rigid adherence to musty and worn-out precedents and trivial
technicalities-to forms which in their origin were of great
value, but which in the progress of events had become use-
less-tended only to conserve error and injustice, and that
when the reason of a rule disappeared, the rule itself should
have fallen.
Forms which were the simple outgrowth of past necessi-
ties, should have ceased when those necessities ceased. If
historic causes gave them birth and vitality, the progress of
history might well cause them to give place to others better
suited to the new order of affairs and existing needs-still,
in no age or time, and under no historic or other changes, can
innovations work out wise results, if devoid of logical
methods.
The true science of pleading is only the adaptation of
pure logic and common sense to the successive statements of
the respective grounds on which the disputants rest their
claims. It is not of modern or hasty growth, though years
ago marred by common counts and general issues, making a
return to logical order, wise and conuendable.
Its formulae, in their essence and principal characteris-
tics, were imported, it is said, from Greece into Rome, and
were cherished in the latter republic throughout its purer
and better days. Although we can not accurately trace the
time or manner of their transmission into English jurispru-
dence, yet we know, inferentially, it must have been before
the "Lex Praetoria" in the third century; for by that law,
special pleading gave place to pleadings at large, working a
revolution in the administration of the law, to the confusion
both of rigid inquiry and of certainty in results. The effect
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may be seen in the marked differences between the nations
where the common and the civil law modes respectively pre-
vail; not that those differences are due solely, either to the
legal rules by which they are governed, or the systems of
administration which obtain, but that modes of investigation
are generally such in a nation as suit the genius of the peo-
ple, and may be considered as the reflex of its mental char-
acteristics, while serving to mould and preserve them. They
are, to no small extent, the determining forces of national
character, whether considered as originally an outgrowth
therefrom, or as subsequently preserving and fashioning it
in the original direction. They are at one and the same time
the operating formatives of character and the evidence
thereof.
If the world appreciated, as fully as philosophers do, the
real importance of a true science of method, a more accurate
estimate would be formed of the immense value of correct
rules of -practice, pleadings, and evidence in the judicial
forum. Before pleadings at large and inquisitorial examina-
tions superseded in Rome the earlier, juster, and more
searching system; its free constitution, and the hardy, bold,
and self-reliant spirit of its citizens had begun to vanish
never to return. Under doubt, uncertainty, and ill-defined
laws, or under a vague, arbitrary, secret or capricious ad-
ministration of them, despotism and servility are born.
Those early formulae on which English practice and special
pleading were founded, exacted a clear, logical, penetrating,
self-reliant, and straightforward course of proceeding. There
was, until they were perverted, but little room left for con-
cealment, or shuffling, or evasion. The spirit of the common
law fostered manliness and self-reliance-was in full conso-
nance with the spirit of the Anglo-Saxon. It treated each
adult as a freeman, and, if sui juris, as capable of managing
his own affairs-as the master of his own destinies.
The philosophical student of history will find a fruitful
source of inquiry into the forces, formative and expressive of
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national character and changes, in the history of its laws and
of the changing modes of administering them. It is not alone
to the battle-fields of a nation, but also to its statute books
and codes, that resort must be had for a true knowledge of
its internal history and character; for the latter speak the
needs of the times and the spirit of rulers and ruled.
At this hour a less extended range of inquiry is demand-
ed-one more immediately practical in its application to a
course of legal study, although the history of law is essential
to a mastery of its principles.
The science of method, then, is an essential part of the
science of law. If general and fundamental truths, evolved
from historic and ethical causes, are to be brought into
beneficent activity how shall such wise results be secured?
The experience of centuries, logical order and precision,
ordinary habits of thought, and common sense, equally sug-
gest that definite, analytic, eliminating, and truthful modes
of investigation ought to obtain; that parties to suits should
not, instead of clearly stating the facts on which their de-
mands are based, be permitted in their pleadings to ramble
through a chaotic mass of surmises and gossip, without sys-
tem, method, or legal relevancy, exacting of courts and juries
the irksome and vain task to ascertain what the parties are
disputing about-whether there is really any legal contro-
versy between them-whether there is, perchance, a grain
of wheat hidden in the many bushels of chaff. Before they
invoke the interposition of courts, weary juries, and harass
witnesses, the litigants ought to ascertain for what such aid
is sought, and speak plainly and to the purpose. If they
know what the controversy is about, they can state it intel-
ligibly, simply, directly, concisely, and truthfully; and if they
do not know, they should learn what they wish to have inves-
tigated before asking for investigation. It is the office of
courts and juries to pass upon real controversies-the issues
which the parties make between themselves-and not to
invent controversies for suitors, and be needlessly harassed
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with unmeaning, impertinent, or frivolous matters, which,
whether true or false, are of no moment whatever, because
they involve no legal rights or considerations, and can serve
no useful purpose.
The primary object of pleading is to bring the litigants
to an issue, so that the question controverted by them
whether of fact or law, may be settled intelligently. "Plead-
ing" in the legal sense is not the oral argument or speeches
addressed to the court or jury, with which in popular use
it is generally confounded, but the written statements by
the respective parties litigant of their cause of action or
complaint on the one hand and the defense thereto on the
other; the analysis by themselves of their respective demands
and defenses. It has been well styled "the voice of the
law," for it utters what the parties have to say. The indis-
pensable prerequisites are first, to have something to say;
secondly, to ascertain what it is; and then to say it so that
others can understand what is said. True eloquence has been
variously defined and its supposed requisites stated, not by
Demosthenes and Cicero alone, but by orators and rhetori-
cians of every age; yet no one has been hardy enough to
assert that one who has nothing to utter, can do more than
utter nothing; or that he who does not know accurately his
own thoughts or views, can communicate them to other
minds more clearly than they exist in his own. A stream
can not rise higher than its source; nor water flow from an
exhausted fountain, or from a cistern where no water has
ever been; nor can a clear and regular flow be had through
a muddy or obstructed channel. Still, modern prejudice
insists that men shall be permitted to annoy courts and
juries, at great public expense, and the law's delay, with
meaningless disputes, involving no legal principles, rights,
or duties; that "the voice of the law" shall be converted
into unintelligible noises or jargon, instead of the utterance
of sound thoughts and solid facts. But for the experience
of our time, it would have seemed hardly "vain jangling."
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If there is no fact to be stated and no thought to be ex-
-pressed, silence is more becoming than idle babbling. Where
nothing is to be transmitted or conveyed, there is no need
of a costly vehicle; the labor of the effort is worse than
foolish; it is expended in an impotent attemDt to make some-
thing out of nothing. "Ex nihito, nit flt'--from nothing,
nothing comes.
There can, it is obvious, therefore, be no proper demand
for judicial inquiry, without a clear, concise, direct, and
positive statement of the case; nor can there be logical order,
or method, or common sense in a system which tolerates a
confused, rambling, incoherent, chaotic and senseless mass
of idle talk about matters unintelligible, and valueless alike
to speaker or hearer. The primary design of pleading then
is to bring the litigants at once, and without shuffling or
prevarication, face to face with the controverted facts or
doctrines. It is a time-saving and truth-exacting process.
It should, therefore, leave no opening for doubt or chance.
It is not enough, however, that issues should be clearly
made up, and the pleadings utter to courts, and juries no
uncertain sound. There must also be some efficient mode
of evolving truth from the mass of confused, and it may be,
discordant evidence offered in support of asserted facts. The
allegations and proofs should correspond. The experience
of ages, sound reason, and daily observation, on this head,
have ripenei into a system of rules, known as the law of
evidence. Large innovations have lately been made in the
system, and it remains to be seen with what advantage to
truth or public and private morals.
All human testimony is necessarily imperfect, not alone
from moral but from mental and physical causes. Tests
must, therefore, be applied for the detection of error and an
accurate ascertainment of facts. If the witness is corrupt,
his testimony is unreliable; just as from a polluted source
no purity can flow. But he may be only prejudiced or unfair,
and then through such a distorted medium, a false coloring
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and misshapen outlines will appear. He may be rigidly
honest and impartial; yet have viewed the acts he would
describe from a wrong standpoint, or only have witnessed
a part of the transaction; or, from inattention or otherwise,
have received at first wholly erroneous impressions; or if the
details were once before his mind, correctly and perfectly,
his memory may have failed to retain them; or he may lack
the power of clearly portraying them in words. Hence the
need of close scrutiny, direct and indirect-of testing the
accuracy of his narrative by examining the witness from
every standpoint at which the occurrences could have been
viewed.
Take for illustration an ordinary case of collision on our
western rivers-concerning which it is proverbial that a
mass of seemingly contradictory evidence is generally of-
fered. The shallow attorney jumping to the conclusion that
the testimony is irreconcilable, insists that perjury has been
committed, and is apt to indulge in unseemly and senseless
vituperation. Thus, he too often seeks to conceal his own
lack of analytic power, and his failure to master the subject.
In a judicial experience of eighteen years it has rarely hap-
pened that the ordinary tests have failed to eliminate the false
from the true-and especially in collision cases, supposed to
be the most doubtful and difficult-in which a patient
analysis generally reconciles each apparently conflicting state-
ment with the most scrupulous regard for truthfulness. Per-
sons on different steamers, moving rapidly in different direc-
tions, and excited by apprehensions of impending danger-
especially if their attention is absorbed by their responsibility
at the moment for the safe management of their own ves-
sels-can seldom receive rigidly accurate impressions con-
cerning each detail of the rapidly shifting occurrences
crowded into a few moments' time. Mathematicians know
how complicated are the elements necessary for a true solu-
tion of any one of the problems known as the parallax of
the stars, and how difficult the solution is when all the sup-
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posed elements -of the problems are given; yet those who
never heard of such problems are expected, when on the.
witness stand, to solve them correctly before the court and
jury, without a statement of, it may be, a fourth of their
essential elements. In its principles, such are the problems
whenever the points of observation of even a fixed object
are different, or the apparent and true position are not the
same-and still more complicated are they when the ob-
server and observed are constantly shifting places, or their
actual and relative positions are momentarily changing.
Neither is apt to make due allowance for such disturbing
elements. Each looks at the approaching vessel as if it
alone were in motion, and he were stationary, or, the impres-
sions instantly fastened on his mind are solely from that
standpoint. If the railway passenger thinks houses, trees
and fences are flying past him at a speed of fifteen or thirty
miles per hour, although he alone is in motion, it would not
be surprising if erroneous impressions are received, when
not only he, but approaching objects, are in equally rapi(
motion. If one of these objects were in his pathway, it might
seem as if it were rushing at his train with deadly mo-
mentum. So a passenger on a steamboat, full of apprehen-
sion as to the coming disaster, takes little or no notice of the
shifting movements of his own vessel, or of its constantly
changed bearings; but with his gaze riveted on the other
moving object, which seems steaming directly at him, is as
certain at th time as of his own existence, that the "col-
liding" boat rushed recklessly, needlessly and directly, and
solely through its own fault, to the dreaded catastrophe. It
requires severe mental effort to dispel such erroneous im-
pressions, even when we are conscious of their falsity. Hence
the necessity of first establishing, by indisputable testimony,
fixed landmarks as constant quantities in the problem around
which, as certain and central truths, the variable, vague
and shifting occurrences may be accurately grouped. Such
analysis and synthesis photograph the scene through all its
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changes. An analogous process is often useful, and some-
times indispensable to a true solution of conflicting testi-
mony in other cases. The last conclusion a legal mind ac-
cepts, is that sworn testimony is corrupt. The primary duty
is to reconcile it with itself and the facts, if possible.
The rules of pleading, practice and evidence, therefore,
constitute, in a large measure, the machinery by which the
law is to be rightly administered; and a knowledge of that
machinery is essential to its correct use. True, the pure
logic of the one, and the orderly and wise conduct of the
others, have been sadly marred by immature and incon-
sistent statutes and contrivances, yet through all the diversi-
fied, disordered, mixed and confused systems forced upon
courts by crude legislation, the labyrinthian clue is to be
found in the pure logic of the ancient system and forms.
Through them we perceive the underlying principles in
which rights rest, and learn how to apply and enforce them
logically and intelligibly.
In its infinite reach the law must regulate and protect
every right, whether of individuals, states or nations, leaving
none, however minute, unused and uncared for; and none,
however wide-spread, beyond its comprehensive grasp. None
is too delicate or insignificant for its penetrating vision; none
too gigantic or world-wide in sweep to escape its control.
Its machinery, therefore, must be susceptible of the nicest
adjustments in order to meet the ever-varying phases of hu-
man rights and duties.
The views thus presented leave no room in solving the
social problem for perplexing disputes about the origin and
nature of the so-called "social contract," the surrender of
natural rights, and other equally speculative puzzles. If
man born into society is consequently born into a life of
relations and of law, his social obligations are coeval with his
existence. A discussion of his supposed abstract rights in
a state of nature, or perfect isolation, as if he were dissevered
from all connection or relationship with his fellow men, might
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be profitable if man existed in the abstract and not in the
concrete. Such speculations, pushed to idealistic extremes,
have been, at times, worse than idle dreams; for it has
been well said that Rousseau's ideas in that direction were
the evangel of Robespierre and of the Reign of Terror.
The Roman satirist was nearer, though yet far from the
truth, when he thus attempted to account for the origin of
law:
"Jura Inventa, metu injusti fateare necesse est,
Tempora si fastosque vells evolvere mundi,
Nec natura potest justo secernere iniquum
Dividit ut bona diversis, fuglenda, petendis."*
-Horace Satires, Lib. 1, Sat. 3.
But if law is a science, and, as has been claimed, "the
perfection of human reason," whence its uncertainties and
imperfections ?
First. Human reason being finite and fallible, cannot
attain to absolute or infinite perfection in its system, actions
or speculations.
Second. The perfect adaptation of human systems through
fallible agencies to the ever shifting and endless modifica-
tions demanded by varying facts and circumstances, is a
task beyond finite skill.
If the few lineaments of the human face are so suscept-
ible of comparatively infinite diversity as to make nearly
every face among the many thousand millions on the earth
clearly distinguishable from all others; and yet mistaken
identity sometimes occurs-why should not the countless
combinations and the modifications necessary to a nice ad-
justment of almost infinite diversities in human relation-
ships, leave room for occasional errors to creep in, even if
the law were absolutely perfect? Yet, as its administration
*(If you consult the origin of things, you must confess that laws were
framed in apprehension of injustice; for nature could not discriminate be.
tween justice and injustice, so as to distinguish good from evil and separate
what ought to be shunned from what ought to be sought.)
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is committed to finite agents, that administration must par-
take of the imperfections of its agencies.
But municipal, statutory, conventional and historic rules
do not always rest on pure ethics, or sound policy, or right
reason; for they are often forced by disturbing causes into
the body of the law, to provide for some temporary or
supposed exigency. Moral and social order, however, exacts
for human happiness prescribed codes for the general conduct
of life; and it is far better than even imperfect rules should
exist, than that society should be left to unbridled anarchy,
licentiousness and crime.
Third. Legislation partakes of all the infirmities of leg-
islators, and is not always directed to the general good.
Selfishness, ignorance, partisanship and passion may so
shape or color it as to make an obligatory statute a sad
anomaly in a well conceived system-the wide door-way
through which untold mischiefs may enter, disturbing the
general harmony and producing the very ills it was osten-
sibly designed to cure.
But the remedy for such ills lies within the domain of
politics. When none but pure statesmen, sound thinkers and
wise jurists, frame statutes and direct polities, better codes
may be expected-crude and incongruous legislation will
cease to mar what human wisdom has, through the experi-
ence of ages, wrought out for social happiness and the
common good.
The comments by Blackstone on this point have greater
force when applied to American law as disturbed by crude
legislation, than they had when spoken of the then existing
condition of English laws:
"The mischiefs that have arisen to the public from
inconsiderate alterations in our laws are too obvious to be
called into question. . . . The common law of England has
fared like other venerable edifices of antiquity, which rash
and inexperienced workmen have ventured to new dress and
refine with all the rage of modern improvement. Hence
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW.
frequently its symmetry has been destroyed, its proportions
distorted, and its majestic simplicity exchanged for spurious
embellishments and fantastic novelties. For, to say the
truth, almost all the -perplexed questions, almost all the nice-
ties, intricacies and delays which have sometimes disgraced
the English as well as other courts of justice. owe their
origin, not to common law itself, but to innovationq that
have been made in it by acts of Parliament, 'overladen' (as
Sir Edward Coke expresses it) 'with provisos and additions,
and many times on a sudden penned, or corrected by men
of none or very little judgment in law.' This great and well-
experienced judge declares that in all his time he never
knew two questions made upon rights merely depending
upon the common law, and warmly laments the confusion
introduced by illjudging and unlearned legislators. 'But if,'
he subjoins, 'acts of Parliament were after the old fashion,
penned by such only as perfectly knew what the common
law as before the making of any act of Parliament concern-
ing that matter, as also how far forth former statutes had
provided remedy for former mischiefs and defects discov-
ered by experience, then should very few questions in law
arise, and the learned should not so often and so much per-
plex their heads to make atonement and peace, by construc-
tion of law, between insensible and disagreeing words, sen-
tences and provisos as they now do.' "
How forcible are such remarks when applied to American
law, as disturbed by American legislation through our many
States, and influenced by conflicting views and diversified in-
terests and habits of thought.
Again: The administration of law is sometimes disturbed
by the gross incompetency and impure motives of unworthy
officers who have stolen within its hallowed precincts to
minister at an altar where they are wholly unfit to serve,
and also to the fact that through legislation the courts
have become almost practically powerless to disrobe incom.
petence and vice.
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The tendency, caused mainly by pressure from the
laity, to throw down all barriers and open wide the doors to
practice in American courts, 'has rendered a lawyer's license
no longer a reliable indication of his fitness to minister at
the altar of truth and justice. None can feel, with half the
force and bitterness, as do bench and bar, the sad and calam-
itous fact that ignorance and vice sometimes wear the robes
which rightfully belong only to sound learning and scrupu-
lous honesty. No degree of popular reproach and indignation
directed against such a stigma upon the profession of law,
will fail to be echoed in full chorus from bench and bar.
It is a noticeable fact that the greatest crimes with
which judicial history has been stained, and against which
the verdict of ages has been recorded, sometimes find, during
disturbed periods of thought, earnest yet unreflecting apolo-
gists for, and advocates of, the monstrous principles on
which those crimes rested for attempted justification. "Mis-
era est servitus, i jus est vagum aul incertum"-(wretched
is that slavery, where the law is vague and unstable)-
and still more wretched is it when popular rage or executive
or legislative tyranny dictates the verdict of juries or judg-
ments of courts.
A Jeffries and a Scroggs condemning the guiltless to
death at the royal behest, and Pontius Pilate from the judg-
ment seat delivering over, at the fierce clamor of the mob,
"the innocent one" to be crucified, stand out prominently
in history as the special monsters of our race. All that is
purest and holiest in our nature and education revolt at
the story of such cowardly betrayal of justice by its own
ministers at its consecrated altar; yet whenever the "popu-
laris aura"-the popular outcry-enters the courtroom to
dictate judgments or mould decisions, without instant and
stern rebuke, the same cowardice sits on the judgment seat
and defiles the altar where it serves. The same principle
which dictated the crucifixion, dominated over the guillotine
during the Reign of Terror. It is the same Robespierrean
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madness and folly that now prates of compelling courts to
feel the ground-swell of surging popular passion-a principle
which, if enunciated in plain language, demands of those
sworn to administer the law-as much for the protection of
the innocent as the punishment of the guilty-to betray their
trusts at the very hour when they should be most firm-
when endangered innocence most piteously and touchingly
needs and implores for the only protection left (the potent
enginery of the law) to save it from remorseless and unbri-
dled hate-that courts should surrender up to vindictive
fury the guiltless, yet pale, shrinking, quivering, helpless
victim clinging to the robes of justice for support-a doctrine
which enthrones lawless violence, and gives over unoffending
virtue and purity to merciless brutality and lust. Infinite
love alone could implore forgiveness for such a crime.
Such monstrous heresies can only prevail where all love
of freedom has died out, or all knowledge of its essential
elements has ceased to be; for law and liberty are insepar-
able. Without law there can be no freedom or safety for
virtue and innocence, no shield for purity, no conceivable
good; nor can there be where its ministers fail through cow-
ardice or corruption to defy tyranny in every form, or cease
to look alone to law in its purity and wisdom as the only
guide, and resolutely insist that "justice be done though
the heavens fall." It is amid the fiercest assaults upon
life, liberty and property that the sanctities of the law
should be most potently protective, and at the summons
of right alike defy the "popularis aura," though it be the
clamor of a whole people, and the "sic jubeo" of the relent-
less despot.
In its calm and unimpassioned administration, blind to
all outside passions and influences, serene in its undisturbed
purity and courage, devoid alike of fear or selfishness, its
magistrates should be as ready as Coke to boldly confront
the King, though surrounded by his Privy Council and
official decapitation be the inevitable doom; or, as was
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Mansfield, to sternly utter sublime warnings from the
bench, even while the infuriate rage of a resistless mob was
surging all around and within the court room, and lashing
with frenzy against the judgment seat, threatening its in-
stant overthrow and his destruction if obedience were not
yielded to its mad behests:
"We are to say what we take the law to be. If we
do not speak our real opinions, we prevaricate with God and
our own conscience.
"Ego hoc animo semper fui, ut invidiam virtute partam,
gloriam non invidiam putarem." "The last end that comes
to any man never comes too soon if he falls in support of the
law and liberty of his country; for liberty is synonymous with
law and government."
Sublime truths, uttered in later times by our own
Webster in nearly the same terms, but with Demosthenic
force, in vindication of constitutional law and liberty, as one
and inseparable!
From the earliest dawn of recorded history, even in its
crudest forms, as well as from the first utterances of law
"amid the thick darkness, thunderings and lightnings of
Sinai," there have come down to us over the buried wrecks
of empires, despite the convulsions and upheavals of inter-
mediate ages and intervening civilizations, the profoundest
and most inspiring examples of legal probity and worth.
We turn ever with grateful reverence to the sublime words
of Grecian wisdom, and listen with rapture to the eloquence
of her sages and jurists. We are at this remote hour
thrilled with the beauties of thought and diction which
nearly two thousand years ago poured forth from Tully's
lips as he advocated the humble poet's cause, or are stirred
with burning indignation as we read his portrayal of, and
invectives against, pro-consular rapacity and cruelty.
Whether in the Senate or forum-whether thundering against
Catiline and his confederates, or earnestly pleading for his
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lowly and defenseless clients-his voice comes fo us with
the ever-living freshness of truth and beauty, freighted with
the legal sanctities embodied afterwards in the Pandects and
Code-thoge treasure-houses of legal Iore-the discovery of
which, after their burial for centuries, dispelled the thicken-
ing gloom of the dark ages, ushered in the dawn of a new
civilization, bespoke to free thought and justiee, long en-
tombed, the coming of their anxiously hoped and prayed-for
resurrection.
From those armories of truth all after times have drawn
their ablest weapons for the defense of endangered right
and the triumph of justice. From those inexhaustible foun-
tains have ever come inspiring draughts to refresh and bless
successive generations.
"Across the gulf of ages we feel in their wise maxims
to-day, the very heart-pulse of their lordly and almost saintly
affections, and glory in their wise warnings and undying
hopes." The legal aphorisms they bequeathed to humanity,
and the pregnant maxims of the common law, announced
by subsequent sages, "Vibrate always as we touch them-
the ever-living sentences of which as Montaigne said of
kindred utterances, we feel that if they were cut, they would
bleed."
Thus from the Hebrew code as given at Sinai, or through
the fabulous and poetic ages of demigods, obscured amid the
dim shadows of remotest history; whether we read of Minos
dispensing perfect justice; gaze at the inscriptions on
Achilles' shield; pore over Solon's matchless constitutions;
consult with Numa, the fabled nymph, inspired with divine
wisdom; or accompany in thought the Roman embassy to
enlightened Greece to borrow thence the resplendent truths
embodied in the Twelve Tables; whether, awestricken, we
behold the subversion of Grecian law through the arts of
Pericles' polished eloquence, or of the early Roman code
through the machinations of the Decemvirs-still, through
all human experiences from the very beginnings of tradi-
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tion and written history, systems born and nurtured in every
age and clime have contributed to the grand current of mod-
ern jurisprudence, pouring into its ever-swelling flood what-
ever was most healthful and potent in the past; just as the
tributaries of yonder river-fed from their far-away and
undetected founts in snow-clad mountains, or from unseen
sources along the wide-spread plains, or from many a recur-
ring cloud and storm which have gathered, perchance, their
refreshing treasures by gentle distillations from distant
ocean surfaces-serve to make up the mighty flow which
past your city bears to the destined gulf richer cargoes than
freighted the argosies of old.
If, law, then, is a system of rules whereby the respective
rights, interests and duties of all members of society are
adapted to and harmonized with each other-and that, too,
whether man is treated simply as a part of a social unit or
of the larger social organizations which, commencing with
neighborhoods, culminate, in their more extended forms, into
nations and the great family of nations, and which, at the
same time, through wide-spread ramifications, call into diver-
sified but voluntary activity an almost infinitely multiplied
set of rules, pertaining, especially, to the various depart-
ments of business pursuits-it must be obvious, that the
system, to answer the needed ends, must be sufficiently
comprehensive, as before suggested, to embrace within its
grasp the well-being of nations, and at the same time suffi-
ciently minute in its details to notice and care for the hum-
blest and most petty, though often the most tormenting, of
earthly annoyances, trials and wants. The primary rules
pertaining to multiform organization-domestic, municipal
and national-are, so to speak, the warp of the vast web;
and the voluntary acts and pursuits of individual life, shoot-
ing through and inweaving themselves into the social tis-
sues, constitute the woof of the wonderful fabric. The
warp prescribed by organic laws is fixed and definite, yet
there is left to personal freedom the largest activity consist-
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ent with justice, for inweaving therein every pattern and
hue which individual tastes, interests and passions may
dictate.
Glance for a moment at the grand legal problem and the
theater of its operations-the many millions on this globe
-nay, thousands of millions-men, women and children-
of every clime, condition and social status-harassed by daily
cares and needs-moved by peculiarities of passions and
tastes-affected by diversities of soil and climate-compelled
by their surroundings and habits to different pursuits for
daily subsistence-compacted into families with all the do-
mestic affections clustering around their hearth-stones and
tugging at their heart-strings-ruled by varied forms of
governmental authority which must be obeyed-pinched by
want or rioting in affluence-pushing in the fierce struggle
for wealth into all openings for gain-jostling their neigh-
bors and struggling with competitors on every hand, at home
and abroad, some of whom may be of their own kin, and
some aliens and strangers, pursuing their energetic rivalry,
even in remote lands ;-fill up the picture with the anxieties,
passions, greeds, charities, struggles and ambitions of nations
and communities, as well as of individuals-and loI a seeth-
ing cauldron-nay, a tempestuous ocean, in which every
globule, though it have a separate existence, is merged into
the common whole and moved by every other globule, all
tossed and swayed by internal, and it may be lashed into
fury by external forces. Imagine such a living ocean of
humanity, covering the whole earth, made up of distinct
and easily-yielding atoms, with ever-active influences operat-
ing from within, and more potent influences from without-
and convulsed with terrible and resistless energies ;-and
then clothe and inter-penetrate each individual of that aggre-
gated mass with sentient forces and personal will-impel
each, first in one direction and then in another, as ever-
varying causes sway it into divergent courses-intensify the
picture through the utmost skill of fancy in its wildest and
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grandest conceptions; and still you will fall far short of the
faintest outlines or feeblest colorings of man's real position,
and far-reaching yet ever-shifting responsibilities in the
social universe--of his infinitely diversified relations to his
fellow-men and to society-an apparently inexplicable and
irredeemable chaos, out of which it would seem only divine
force could summon order-over which the omnipotent fiat,
as at creation, could alone command the needed light-alone
could crystalize into intelligible forms the unshaped and
seething mass as it lies without form and void, while dark-
ness covers the face of the deep.
That divine command-the omnipotent fiat-spoke into
being not only the physical and moral universe, but the laws
of their existence and governing forces. True order, illu-
mination and resultant harmony come only through those
ever present and operative laws. Out of seemingly irre-
claimable chaos, where all is discord and conflict-incessant,
Titanic-the experience and wisdom of ages have, through
law, evolved the existing forms of moral and social order.
Unnumbered centuries have been busy with the task; each
age and generation leaving to its successors the fruit of its
investigations, toils and experiences, till now, in the fruition
of time, we have garnered up all that the past has taught,
and behold that where moral and social chaos might have
reigned, the laws of peace and duty and of a benignant
civilization rule-a moral universe with its myriad hosts,
resplendent in their single, binary and constellated beauty,
never jostling each other or forced from their true orbits,
free from discord and conflict- 'cycle and epicycle, orb in
orb "-all in their peaceful revolutions and changes pealing
forth ever the babled music of the spheres.
But it is not in such generic statements that the dearest
and most touching benedictions of the law are heard. Every
individual has his own life to live. It may be that, sur-
rounded by family needs, or inspired by lofty emotions of
patriotism or duty, he is willing to sacrifice himself for the
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well-being of others. Still, as an individual, he is never
so merged into the common humanity as to lose his personal
identity: No temptations, false reasonings, or spirit of self-
sacrifice, can make him forget or forego his consciousness,
around which cluster ever all his hopes and fears. He is,
and must ever remain, responsible to himself-to his own
conscience-as well as to his fellow-men and to his God.
To him the hour of calamity may come, when, enmeshed
by sorrow and treacherous fate, he and his dependent wife
and children, struggling for bread or what is dearer than
bread or even life, seek to rescue themselves from the toils
and artifices of the spoiler by yielding their cause, in which
all is involved that makes life endurable, to the arbitrament
of the law. Days and months of doubt and fear may inter-
vene-to them, it may be days and months of agony. They
wait the verdict and judgment with terrible anxiety, alternat-
ing betveen hope and despair; clinging convulsively to each
promise of rescue, or shrinking with dismay at even the
faintest whisper of doubt. Thus into the most intimate
confidences, where the soul opens its secret recesses as at
the confessional, the lawyer is often called to enter; and
around those confidences the law, in its wisdom, throws
inviolable sanctity. No physician at the bedside of the dy-
ing, when the trembling patient and heart-stricken family are
waiting with agonizing suspense the threatened stroke, can
feel a sadder responsibility than the lawyer, when husband
-and father, with wife and children, cling to him with frantic
terror or despair for their rescue from a living death. The
pages of poetry and romance contain no such pathos-the
myriad-minded dramatist could portray no such force or
variety of passions-as are yearly involved in the more than
dramatic scenes enacted in the courts, or through them in
the homes of those whose fate hangs upon their judgments.
Each trial has its incidents and passions-it may be its
tender, romantic or pathetic passages-many of which, all
unseen by mortal eye, are pulsating 'with heart-throbs, ab-
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sent, unknown, unthought of, yet anxious and expectant
souls. Love and hate, pride and shame, avarice and un-
thrift, vice and virtue-all human affections, passions and
aspirations, all that is noblest and purest, as well as all
that is meanest and vilest, in frail and erring human nature-
may underlie or be involved in the calm forensic dispute, or
dispassionate judicial inquiry. To the stricken hearth-stone
the verdict and judgment may bring agony unutterable,
crushing out the last feeble flickerings of hope, or may come
as with angelic tidings of great joy, lifting the hitherto dark
and impenetrable clouds, which had settled like a pall upon
wife and daughter, father and husband, as they sat breath-
less with anxiety for the result of the dread ordeal.
Poverty to be rescued, frauds exposed, villainies pun-
i-hed, innocence vindicated, suffering alleviated, dangers
averted, wrongs redressed, and rights defended, are the
daily legal experiences. No portrayal of sufferings, or of
triumphant virtue, of crime, revenge or hate, can surpass
the familiar realities of daily life, dimly veiled, it may be,
yet discernible behind the seemingly stolid face, or through
suppressed sobs, or assumed stoicism; or wailed forth in
irrepressible anguish, as the solemn arbitrament of the judi-
cial forum stamps them with their true and ineffaceable
colors, and seals the doom or rescue of an anguished and
trembling life. How terrible is the responsibility amid such
scenes, of undertaking to unravel the tangled web woven
by fraud and cunning to ensnare the innocent and wrong
the unsuspecting,--and how inexcusable the pride, folly,
avarice, or ambition of him who enters the lists for the vin-
dication of wronged innocence or defrauded honesty, only to
suffer truth and right to be borne down through his unworthy
championship on an arena where he was incompetent to the
contestl
Many judicial proceedings involve also the largest pub-
lic consequences, and partake of the heroic interest of con-
tending armies, where the fate of nations is at issue. The
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stirring description by Macaulay of the trial of the Seven
Bishops is surpassed by no known narrative of ancient or
modern battles. In the conduct of that cause, on the deci-
sion of which British liberty seemed to hang, the varying
phases of litigation succeeded each other with dramatic
transition and rapidity, while a nation listened with sus-
pended breath. Despite all the appliances of tyranny through
corruption and servility, its asserted prerogative to suspend
and dispense with the laws of the realm met with fearless
resistance from skilled and undismayed barristers, and a
resultant overthrow by the verdict of an upright jury-
a result which, as the news thereof swept in tides of exulta-
tion through the city and rolled over hamlet and shire, surg-
ing even through the royal camp at Hounslow Heath, quick-
ened the tyrant's fears into flight, and popular action into
the entrenchment of liberty behind safer barriers and within
more invincible strongholds.
The history of law, as the outgrowth of human progress,
is eminently the history of civilization. Though dynasties
and empires may go down on the battle-field amid the shock of
contending armies, yet an almost unnoticed statute or quiet
decision from the judgment seat may work out a grander
and more enduring revolution. The sturdy independence of
Coke was the precursor of the Petition of Right, and the
verdict in the case of the Seven Bishops gave birth to the
Bill of Rights, and overthrew the dynasty of the Stuarts.
Macaulay's gorgeous description of the trial of Warren
Hastings has held every student of English literature spell-
bound as with the sublime strains of a Milton-a trial to
which the world owes the grandest exhibitions of forensic
skill-the impassioned outbursts of Sheridan, the philosoph-
ical and polished eloquence of Burke, than which neither an-
cient nor modern records furnish aught more thrilling or
cogent-more worthy of the highest conceptions of human
power and greatness; displayed, too, on a field where no
brute force met like force, but where mind coped with mind,
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and the keenness of the conflict was illumined with more
than flashes of artillery, and impassioned eloquence awoke
as intense enthusiasm as the battle's roar.
It was on that occasion that Burke, appointed by the
House of Commons to arraign in its name, at the bar of the
House of Lords, a worse than Verres in popular estimation,
announced some of the axiomatic truths on which all law
must rest for sanction-truths worthy of constant repetition
and of eternal remembrance:
"We have no arbitrary power to give, because arbitrary
power is a thing which neither any man can hold, nor any
man can give. No man can lawfully govern himself accord-
ing to his own will, much less can a person be governed
by the will of another. We are all born in subjection-all
born equally, high or low, governors and governed, in sub-
jection to one great, immutable, pre-existent law, prior to all
our devices and prior to all our contrivances, paramount to
all our ideas and to all our sensations, antecedent to our very
existence: by which we are knit and connected in the eternal
frame of the universe-out of which we can not stir.
"This arbitrary power is not to be had by conquest.
Nor can any sovereign have it by succession; for no one
can succeed to fraud, rapine and violence. Those who give
and those who receive arbitrary power are alike criminal,
and there is no man but is bound to resist it to the best of
his powers wherever it shall show its face to the world.
"We may bite our chains if we will, but we shall be
made to know ourselves; and be taught that man is born to
be governed by law; and he that will substitute will in the
place of it is an enemy to God.
"There is one thing, and one thing only, which defies all
mutation: that which existed before the world, and will
survive the fabric of the world itself-I mean justice; that
justice which, emanating from the divinity, has a place in the
bosom of every one of us, given us for our guide with regard
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to ourselves and with regard to others; and which will stand
after this globe is burned to ashes, our advocate or our ac-
cuser, before the Great Judge when he comes to call upon
us for the tenor of a well-spent life."
History furnishes many apt illustrations of the truth
which Burke thus vindicated. In the progress of civilization,
despotic will, arbitrary enactments, unjust statutes, and
codes devoid of right, have strewed the pathway with their
wrecks; intimating to the passers-by through what strug-
gles and convulsions the world has marched forward to its
present attainments. The history of exploded errors and
wrongs is the great negative history of humanity; it fur-
nishes warnings for all subsequent times, and enables the
jurist and statesman to detect where injustice and falsehood
lie buried, or where are the quicksands in which, if trusted,
public happiness is sure to be engulfed.
Well was it said by Burke that "law and arbitrary power
are at eternal enmity"; for where law ceases, despotism be-
gins, or anarchy, the worst of tyrants, bears destructive
sway:-
"Chaos umpire sits,
And by decision more embroils the fray."
One of the most unexpected and yet effective rebukes
ever administered to servile flattery is described by Balmes:
During the reign of Philip the Second of Spain, noted for his
bigotry and cruelties, a priest, during a sermon delivered
before that monarch and his court, announced the pestilential
doctrine, that "sovereigns have an absolute power over the
persons as well as the property of their subjects." For his
utterance of so detestable a sentiment, the Spanish Inquisi-
tion summoned him to trial for heresy, and sentenced him to
undergo many severe penalties, and also to read in the
same place and before the same monarch and court a solemn
recantation in these prescribed words:
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"Indeed, gentlemen, kings have no other power over
their subjects than what is given to them by the divine and
human law: they have none proceeding from their own free
and absolute will."
The truth thus vindicated by the Spanish Inquisition
during the bloodiest and most bigoted reign in modern times,
and in the presence of that self-willed and imperious tyrant
-a truth sacred to liberty and justice-found many of its
sturdiest champions in England during the stormy prologue
of its great revolution, and has never lacked for them in our
own land or under any constitutional and free government.
When John Pym arraigned the Earl of Strafford for his
arbitrary exactions in Ireland-for tyrannies subversive of
the fundamental laws of the realm and of British liberty-
he uttered the same truthful doctrine:
"If you take away the law, all things will fall into con-
fusion. The law is the safeguard, the custodian of all pri-
vate interests. Your honor, your lives, your liberties and
your estates are all in the custody of the law."
The eulogium of Cicero upon the liberal arts is espe-
cially applicable to law as a science-to law in its large and
beneficent action when conceived, administered, and studied
in a truly catholic spirit. "Nam caetera, neque temporum
sunt, neque aetatum omnium, neque locorum: haec studia
adolescentiam alunt, senectutem oblectant, secundas res
ornant, adversis perfugium ac solatium praebent; delectant
domi, non impediunt foris; pernoctant nobiscum, peregri-
nantur resticantur."*
*("For other studies are not for all times, ages, and places; but these
nurture our youth and give joy to our old age; they adorn our prosperity
and prove the needed solace and refuge in adversity; fill our homes with
delight, and are none the less beneficient to us when abroad; in our rural
pursuits, journeyings and pleasures, and equally in our foreign wanderings,
they are still with us to bless and protect; and through the quiet watches
of the night they dwell by our side or hover over us with their guardian
wings.")
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But the simple panegyric of Hooker has never been sur-
passed:
"Of law there can be no less acknowledged than that
her seat is the bosom of God; her voice the harmony of the
world; all things in heaven and earth do her homage; the
very least as feeling her care and the greatest as not ex-
empted from her power; both angels and men, and creatures
of what condition soever, though each in different sort and
manner, yet all with uniform consent, admiring her as the
mother of their peace and joy."
Grand and far-reaching as are the truths thus suggested
concerning the nature and office of law, yet no student, with
fair general attainments and a clear intellect, need despair
of mastering its leading principles, and grasping their fam-
iliar applications. Coke speaks of law as a jealous mistress;
she can be won only by patient wooing. Devotion to fund-
amental principles and the reasons on which they rest; a
discriminating judgment to apply them correctly; familiarity
with legal modes of investigation; the habit of diligent study;
a determination never to float on the surface when the under-
lying depths are to be sounded; and, more than all, sturdy
manliness and unimpeachable integrity, will enable the young
man to embark with safety and credit upon the voyage. The
lawyer's life is one of incessant study. The great prepara-
tion is to know how to study wisely. Let, then, the students
now about to enter upon the prescribed course bear con-
stantly in mind, that no amount of "cramming" by Profes-
sors will avail! Their own minds must be in constant activ-
ity. They must so assimilate the legal truths they learn, as
to make them really a part of their own being. Their voca-
tion is to advise and support others; master perplexities and
doubts; unravel entanglements; sift discordant versions of
fact; detect the rules applicable to every shifting phase of
business; know how to pluck out the heart of each mystery
-to bring order out of chaos. If destitute of the requisite
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mental training, no memory lumbered with cases and prece-
dents will suffice. If the meaning of forms and the reason
of rules are unknown, they can not be safely used; they will
be hindrances instead of helps. There must be no "sticking
in the bark"-no mere surface work. The broad expanse
must be surveyed, and the interdependence of the parts un-
derstood. In short, law must be treated both as a pure and
an applied science, with boundless adaptability and capac-
ities. In no other way can one become a lawyer worthy of
the name.
If law be thus viewed, it will be recognized as the essen-
tial basis of all social organizations-as the custodian, pre-
server, and fostering parent of all human interests, furnish-
ing the indispensable elements of social vitality. Those
vital elements must be as all-pervading and free as the at-
mosphere we breathe.
When we lie down, and when we rise up; during the
silent watches of the night, while buried in unconscious and
helpless slumber, as well as during the din and tumult of
the day; in the weakness of infancy and strength of man-
hood; for feeble woman and infirm old age; in the bustle of
tile mart or workshop, and at the quiet fireside; in the re-
mote cabin, lonely in its isolation from human haunts or
buried in the depths of the wilderness, as well as in the
thronged streets of crowded cities; whatever our age, sex,
or condition, wherever situated, and however shelterless and
impoverished, careworn or weary, all around and about us,
above and beneath, is the ever-present, life-giving, life-sus-
taining, though unseen, and it may be unfelt, atmosphere
of law.
Its beneficent and preservative forces, when undisturbed,
are as gentle in their influences as a summer's cloudless twi-
light or the falling dew; but if convulsed by passion and
wrong, as terrible as the whirlwind or deluge.
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